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This paper reports on a study to provide insights into the magnitude of the shocks 
associated  with  the  recent  global  economic  crisis  in  macroeconomic  terms  in 
South Africa, the country’s capacity to withstand or cushion these shocks, and the 
extent  of  fragility  in  terms  of  poverty  levels  and  child  wellbeing.  The  analysis 
combines macro-economic and micro-economic tools to assess the extent of the 
crisis’ impact on the country. The study finds that the poverty headcount ratio 
increases little in the moderate crisis scenario, but substantially under the severe 
scenario. However, under both scenarios there is a relatively successful return to 
close to the business as usual trend. It is important to note though that under 
both scenarios, more poverty sensitive measures (the poverty gap ratio and the 
poverty  severity  ratio)  decline  more,  and  remain  in  negative  territory  longer, 
showing that the major impact of the crisis is on the poorest, and that this impact 
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1.  Introduction 
The  United  States  of  America  subprime  mortgage  crisis  which  began  in  August  2007 
degenerated into a full-scale global financial crisis between August and October 2008. After a 
lag, the crisis began to be felt by South Africa. The country has especially been affected by the 
sharp fall in demand for its export products, the fall in prices of key export commodities and 
falling foreign investment. The economy was recently plunged into a recession for the first time 
in 17 years and its macroeconomic forecasts have had to be revised downwards substantially
1. 
The  declining  growth  has  potentially  negative  implications  for  incomes,  employment, 
investment and on social programmes partly through the slowdown’s effect on tax revenues for 
government.  
Poverty in the country is much higher than one would expect in a country with its level of per 
capita gross domestic product (GDP). There is a high degree of inequality in the country, and it 
has its origins in the apartheid policies of the past. Child poverty, in turn, is still much higher 
than poverty amongst adults. There is widespread concern that the global economic crisis may 
have exacerbated the situation. This makes it imperative to deal with the phenomenon of child 
poverty as a specific issue. This is necessary to prevent large numbers of children growing up in 
dire  circumstances  that  can  prevent  them  from  developing  their  potential.  Economically, 
childhood poverty also leaves a mark in terms of poor human capital and lower productivity in 
later life, thus creating the risk of a vicious cycle of poverty. To ensure that upward mobility of 
those  born  into  poor families  is possible,  South  Africa  needs to  create  conditions that  will 
reduce child poverty. 
This paper (to our knowledge the first of its kind) studies the impact of the world economic 
crisis on child poverty in South Africa. It does this by linking a macro-economic Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) model to micro-economic analysis in order to identify the channels 
through which economic performance may impact on child poverty and to estimate its likely 
magnitude.  
                                                       
1  Gross  domestic  product  at  market  prices  quarter  on  quarter  growth  figures  for  South  Africa  reveal  that  the  economy 
experienced three quarters of negative growth (from the fourth quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2009). The definition 
of a recession is when a country experiences two successive quarters of negative quarter on quarter growth on a seasonally 
adjusted basis. 5 
 
 
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 describes the data used for 
the model and the profile of child poverty while section 3 discusses the model and simulations. 
Section 4 reports and discusses results of the various simulations and section 5 concludes.  
2.  Data and the profile of child poverty 
The Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) used for the CGE model is based on the 2005 Supply and 
Use  tables obtained  from  Statistics  South  Africa  and  other  national  data  sets from  various 
sources such as the Reserve Bank. The SAM has 54 activities and 54 commodities; two factors 
of production, labour and capital; four agents (households, enterprises, government and the 
rest of world); and two accumulation accounts (change in inventories and gross fixed capital 
formation). 
Trade parameters are obtained from Gibson (2003) while low-bound export supply and demand 
elasticities  are  obtained  from  Behar  and  Edwards  (2004).  To  our  knowledge,  estimates  for 
parameters  used  in  production  functions  and  in  households’  demand  functions  are  not 
available for South Africa. Therefore values from the literature surveyed by Annabi et al. (2006) 
were used. 
One of the main transmission channels of the crisis is a decrease in export and import prices 
and demand. Table 1 presents trade relations between South Africa and the rest of the world in 
2005. It specifies the import penetration rate as well as the sectoral share of imports in total 
imports. Moreover, it details the sectoral export intensity rates measured as a share of exports 




Table 1 : Structure of South African trade (tradables) (%) 
Sectors  Exports 
intensity rate as 




shares as a proportion 
of total exports (%) 
Imports 
penetration rate as 
a share of total 
sectoral supply (%) 
Sectoral Imports 
share as a 
proportion of total 
imports (%) 
Agriculture, forestry 
& fishing  
21,89  4,14  5,84  1,09 
Coal mining   48,96  5,01  4,47  0,26 
Gold & uranium ore 
mining  
98,65  6,58  0,53  0,00 
Other mining   50,65  12,82  30,55  11,08 
Food   8,50  2,38  6,02  2,52 
Beverages & tobacco   22,16  2,29  2,54  0,42 
Textiles   16,58  0,70  14,40  1,15 
Wearing apparel   12,89  0,54  11,41  1,27 
Leather & leather 
products  
35,87  0,44  17,45  0,26 
Footwear   5,12  0,05  20,39  0,72 
Wood & wood 
products  
12,94  0,61  8,98  0,50 
Paper & paper 
products  
15,95  1,45  8,81  0,96 
Printing, publishing 
& recorded media  
4,89  0,22  14,78  1,10 
Coke & refined 
petroleum products  
17,39  2,59  5,34  1,30 
Basic chemicals   30,81  4,60  21,66  4,32 
Other chemicals & 
man-made fibres  
11,54  2,09  12,53  3,95 
Rubber products   23,54  0,48  22,56  0,91 
Plastic products   5,54  0,36  9,13  0,73 
Glass & glass 
products  
11,56  0,19  12,64  0,29 
Non-metallic 
minerals  
7,71  0,46  11,18  0,87 
Basic iron & steel   62,48  10,48  11,56  1,24 
Basic non-ferrous 
metals  
47,03  2,94  19,44  1,10 
Metal products 
excluding machinery  
19,02  1,79  13,88  1,66 
Machinery & 
equipment  
67,47  7,11  35,35  12,83 
Electrical machinery   13,23  0,97  17,18  2,25 
Television, radio & 
communication 
equipment  
53,25  0,88  39,74  5,26 
Professional &  84,86  0,90  30,42  2,40 7 
 
Source: Own computations from SAM (2005) 
 
 
From the Table above, it can be seen that gold (98% of its production), scientific equipment 
(84%) or machinery and equipment (67%) heavily rely on exports. A decrease in world demand 
or an increase in international prices for these commodities will thus have a huge impact on the 
balance of payments and on economic activity. In the same way, some commodities such as 
radio and equipment (39%) and other mining (30%) rely disproportionately more on imports. 
For  these  sectors,  a  decrease  in  international  prices  will  stimulate  imports  and  increase 
scientific equipment  
Motor vehicles, parts 
& accessories  
20,46  6,72  23,08  15,32 
Other transport 
equipment  
27,40  0,68  33,73  3,24 
Furniture   48,87  1,71  9,48  0,56 
Other industries   18,34  1,94  12,97  3,01 
Electricity, gas & 
steam  
0,96  0,11  0,02  0,00 
Water supply   0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00 
Building construction   0,05  0,02  0,26  0,09 
Wholesale & retail 
trade  




21,33  1,45  22,81  2,49 
Railway transport   15,39  0,58  9,16  0,35 
 Road transport   7,42  1,93  1,55  0,37 
Transport via 
pipeline  
16,04  0,04  0,00  0,00 
Water transport   13,52  0,53  31,67  2,80 
Air transport   20,37  0,65  32,11  2,18 
Transport support 
services  
9,87  0,80  12,74  1,21 
Communication   7,01  2,21  6,13  2,00 
Finance & insurance   6,26  0,61  9,71  1,40 
Business services   3,90  4,61  1,70  1,97 
Medical, dental & 
other health & 
veterinary services  
0,60  0,11  1,01  0,20 
Community, social & 
personal services  
3,69  1,22  6,47  2,29 8 
 
competition from foreign suppliers on domestic market. Since South Africa exports most of its 
mineral and precious metals, together accounting for 40.9% of total exports, an external shock 
on mineral prices would likely have strong effects on the economy.  
The 2005 GDP projections for South Africa were used to build the Business As Usual (BAU) 
scenario. To replicate GDP growth rate projections, population growth and capital accumulation 
were combined with an endogenous rate of growth of total factor productivity. Investments by 
destination  as  well  as  depreciation  rates  by  activities  were  taken  from  the  South  African 
Reserve Bank. Given that official data projected a smaller growth for population than what was 
anticipated for capital, the BAU scenario shows a decrease in unemployment. Moreover, as 
production factors become more efficient, prices decrease (in real terms). 
To derive a profile of child poverty, we set a poverty line at the 40th percentile of household 
per capita income in the 2005 Incomes and Expenditure Survey (IES)
2. Naturally, there are 
important issues about the appropriate poverty line and about whether it would make a 
difference if some adult equivalent scale were used instead of per capita income. However, we 
have dealt with that in another work (Streak, Yu and Van der Berg, 2009). We concluded that 
the profile of poverty is not really affected by using any adult equivalent scale and that there is 
stochastic poverty dominance across most dimensions
3. In other words, the poverty profile 
would not change much if an alternative poverty line or an alternative poverty measure to the 
headcount ratio were used. Therefore, using per capita income rather than adult equivalent 
income shows that our findings on the insensitivity of the child poverty profile to the choice of 
adult equivalence scale support the argument of Woolard and Leibbrandt (2006). This is that 
one may as well use the simple per capita method of profiling poverty in South Africa and 
testing its robustness to alternative poverty lines.   
                                                       
2 The line is arbitrary, but agrees with what a number of other authors have used, particularly in assessing the effect of the 
adult equivalence scale. 
3  The  exception  is  the  provinces.  There  is  no  stochastic  poverty  dominance  across  this  dimension,  thus  there  are  some 
provinces where the poverty ranking would change if another poverty line or another poverty measure were used. 9 
 
  
Table 2 presents the profile of child poverty. Poor households tend to be larger. Therefore, the 
poverty headcount for the population as a whole is 52.9%. However, poorer households have a 
disproportionate number of children: 65.5% of children are amongst the poor (this converts 
into  11.8  million  poor  children)
4  as against only 45.2% of the adult population. Moreover, 
similar differences between adult and child poverty apply for the depth and severity of poverty. 
In fact, the proportional differentials are larger, indicating that children’s share of the poverty 
headcount  rises  if  lower  poverty  lines  are  used  because  of  more  severe  poverty  amongst 
children compared to adults. 
With respect to age, Table 2 illustrates that the poverty headcount and poverty shares based on 
the  headcount  are  highest  amongst  the  youngest  age  cohort,  followed  by  children  aged 
between 5 and 14 and between 15 and 17. The profile also confirms the racial dimension of 
child  poverty,  which  is  much  higher  amongst  black  children  and  high  amongst  coloured 
children
5. The poverty depth and severity measures are also far higher for children from these 
groups. There is little gender difference in child poverty. Child poverty is still more prevalent, 
deeper and more severe in rural areas – nearly two thirds of children identified as poor live in 
rural areas. Its rural face is the most prominent feature of child poverty in South Africa, and this 
especially applies when the depth and severity of poverty are considered: the rural poor are 
further below this poverty line than the urban poor are, and the share of the rural child poverty 
headcount thus rises as the poverty line is set lower. There is large variation across provinces in 
child poverty.  
                                                       
4 This level, though somewhat arbitrary considering the equally arbitrary choice of the poverty line, can be seen in the context 
of findings based on earlier data sets that used similar poverty cut offs.  The National Institute for Economic Policy (NIEP) 
measurement study (1996), which is based on the Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development (PSLSD) of 1993, 
and which used the old Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Adult Equivalent Scale (AES), found 
the poverty headcount amongst children aged between birth and 4 years of age to be 60%.  Woolard (2002), using the October 
Household Survey (OHS) 1999, a welfare indicator of adult equivalent income and a Cutler and Katz (1992) type AES with the 
child cost parameter set at 0.6 and economies of scale parameter at 0.9, found it to be 59.2% amongst children aged between 
birth and 17 and 59.3% amongst children aged between birth and 6. Thus the poverty findings here are not all that different 
from those in previous studies, whereas there is somewhat less child poverty if the suggested Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) 
poverty line is used.  
5 Defining households by colour is one of the popular ways used in South Africa. Including the race-based definition is rooted in 
the apartheid period policies. The ‘black’ people of South Africa are natives of the country. They include mainly the Zulu, Xhosa, 
Ndebele, Swazi, Sotho-Tswana, Tsonga and the Venda language groups. ‘White’ people are mainly descendents of the colonial 
immigrants of Dutch, German, French Huguenot and British origin. ‘Coloureds’ are most commonly people of a mixed race or 
descendants of the Khoi and San. ‘Asians’ are mainly people of Indian descent (South Africa. Info, 2007).  
 10 
 
Though the poverty incidence is highest in Limpopo, the poverty share of the more populous 
provinces  is  larger.  Kwazulu-Natal  and  the  Eastern  Cape  together  have  46%  of  the  poor 
children. The rankings for the poverty severity measure are slightly different from those on the 
depth and headcount measures. This indicates that stochastic poverty dominance does not 
always  hold.  Kwazulu-Natal  has  the  most  severe  poverty,  while  it  has  the  second  highest 
poverty depth and the third highest poverty headcount. Limpopo ranks third in terms of the 
severity and depth measures, but first on the poverty headcount measure. Western Cape is the 
best performer on all three of the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty measures – it has the 
lowest child poverty headcount rate (P0)
6, the lowest depth of child poverty (also known as the 
child poverty gap ratio [P1])
7 and the lowest child poverty severity ratio (P2)
8.  
 
Table 2 : Poverty profile for children using per capita income as the welfare measure and with 
the poverty line set at 40
th percentile of households 
  Child poverty (0-17 years)  Adult poverty 
  P0 


























Number  Rate (%) 
Age 
0-4  66.1  26.0  3 066 509  0.336  0.213       
5-14  65.7  56.5  6 681 507  0.343  0.202       
15-17  63.8  17.5  2 067 609  0.332  0.203       
 0-17 (all children)  65.5  100.0  11 822 544  0.328  0.205       
18+ (all adults)            45.2  0.213  0.126 
Racial group 
Black  72.5  93.9  11 100 826  0.375  0.232  54.4  0.261  0.156 
Coloured  41.3  5.3  623 412  0.167  0.093  30.1  0.110  0.057 
Asian  24.2  0.7  76 137  0.093  0.052  13.7  0.049  0.027 
White  2.0  0.2  18 081  0.012  0.008  1.2  0.006  0.004 
Gender 
Girls  65.4  49.1  5 819 410  0.336  0.204  39.7  0.238  0.142 
Boys  65.6  50.9  5 985 265  0.332  0.206  49.9  0.184  0.109 
Urban/Rural location 
Rural  82.8  63.3  7 376 451  0.446  0.280  69.0  0.344  0.209 
Urban  48.6  36.7  4 442 491  0.226  0.133  31.7  0.139  0.080 
Province 
Western Cape  37.9  5.0  0 587 580  0.153  0.085  25.1  0.094  0.048 
                                                       
6 The headcount ratio, P0, is the number of poor below the poverty line out of the total population. 
7 The poverty gap is defined as the average poverty gap in a population as a proportion of a poverty line. It accounts for the 
intensity of poverty, meaning how poor the poor are. 
8 The severity of poverty gives more weight to the lowest incomes.  11 
 
Eastern Cape  77.9  20.1  2 378 696  0.415  0.258  59.8  0.292  0.174 
Northern Cape  69.1  2.0  0 235 269  0.333  0.195  48.5  0.219  0.126 
Free State  63.6  5.9  0 695 166  0.294  0.171  44.2  0.193  0.110 
Kwazulu-Natal  75.0  25.2  2 975 734  0.413  0.266  53.8  0.279  0.175 
Northwest  66.2  8.1  0 962 355  0.345  0.216  49.3  0.239  0.143 
Gauteng  41.3  9.6  1 138 511  0.186  0.110  26.0  0.111  0.065 
Mpumalanga  66.4  7.2  0 846 494  0.322  0.187  48.6  0.218  0.123 
Limpopo  78.0  16.9  2 002 739  0.400  0.242  65.6  0.313  0.183 
 Source: Own calculations using income and expenditure of households (IES) 2005 data 
 
Testing the robustness of the child poverty profile to select the poverty line found the age, race, 
gender, and urban-rural dimensions to be robust. In the poverty-relevant range, there is clear 
first  order  dominance  in  each  of  these  cases.  This  implies  that  the  poverty  rankings  are 
invariant to the poverty line chosen and to whether the poverty measure used is P0, P1 or P2. 
Figure 1 below shows that the results for the provincial rankings are slightly more complex and 
hence the provincial cumulative density functions or curves (CDFs) or poverty incidence curves. 
The CDF shows the population arranged from poorest to richest using the selected poverty 
measure and expresses those below any possible poverty line as a percentage of the total 
population (Deaton, 1997). In other words, it shows the headcount ratio of poverty at different 
poverty lines. It is therefore also known as a poverty incidence curve. Regardless of where the 
poverty line is drawn, Western Cape and Gauteng have the lowest child poverty headcount 
rates.  However,  the  Western  Cape  has  the  lowest  headcount  up  to  an  income  level  of 
approximately R6 000 per capita, per annum. Thereafter, however, there is a change. Except for 
the very low poverty lines, three provinces – Kwazulu-Natal, Limpopo and Eastern Cape – have 
the highest poverty headcounts. There is also a shift in the rankings of the weakest performers 



















Where  one  CDF  consistently  lies  above  another,  there  is  first-order  stochastic  poverty 
dominance. This implies that the ranking of poverty between two provinces remains unchanged 
whatever poverty line is used and whichever of the three FGT poverty measures (P0, P1 or P2) 
is  analysed.  The  intersections  of  the  lines  implies  that  both  the  poverty  line  chosen  and 
whether the poverty measure used is the headcount, depth or severity of child poverty affect 
the  ranking  of  child poverty.  This  confirms  the  results  from  Table  2.  It  does  matter  which 
measure is used, and this analysis implies that the choice of the poverty line itself is important 
for ranking poverty between provinces. At very low poverty lines, the severity of child poverty 
that  Kwazulu-Natal experiences  will  be reflected  even  in the headcount index.  However,  if 
poverty lines are set high, there is a danger of underestimating Kwazulu-Natal’s child poverty 
share when focusing on the headcount rate only.  
The profile of child poverty in South Africa presented here, based on IES 2005, suggests that 
child poverty (at 65.5%) remains more extensive than poverty amongst the population as a 
whole (52.9%) and poverty amongst adults (45.2%), if the chosen poverty line includes 40% of 
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Moreover, despite the massive injection of transfers to households with poor children through 
child support grants, poverty amongst children remains substantial.   
The  child  poverty  profile  sheds  new  light  on  the  age  dimensions  of  child  poverty.  The 
headcount, depth and severity of poverty are all higher amongst children in the youngest age 
cohort (birth to 4) followed by children aged 5 to 14, followed by those aged 15 to 17. This is 
surprising because the child support grant did not extend to the oldest group at the time of the 
survey.  One  would  expect  households  containing  only  older  children  to  experience  more 
poverty.   
3.  Methodology: 
To evaluate the impacts of the world economic crisis on South Africa, a sequential dynamic CGE 
model  based  on  the  dynamic  Poverty  and  Economic  Policy  (PEP  1-t)  standard  model  by 
Decaluwé  et  al  (2009) was  used,  changing  several  assumptions  to  better  reflect  the  South 
African economy. The model has two production factors, capital and labour. Labour is further 
disaggregated into informal, unskilled, semi-skilled and highly skilled workers. The production 
function technology is assumed to be of constant returns to scale and is presented in a four-
level production process. At the first level, output is a Leontief function of value added and 
total intermediate consumption. At the second level, a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
function represents the imperfect substitution between composite labour and capital. At the 
third level, composite labour demand is also a CES function between composite skilled and 
composite  unskilled  labour.  Note  that  the  composite  skilled  demand  is  a  CES  with  a  low 
elasticity  between  skilled  and  semi-skilled  workers,  reflecting  the  fact  that  it  is  difficult  to 
substitute  semi-skilled  for  skilled  workers.  We  also  use  a  CES  to  describe  the  composite 
unskilled labour demand between informal and unskilled workers.  
South  Africa  faces  high  unemployment  and  has  a  highly  unionised  labour  force  that  has 
substantial bargaining strength. As a result, wages and salaries are strongly rigid downwards. To 
take this rigidity into account, it is assumed that wages cannot decline below some minimum. 
Thus, if production decreases, producers will not be able to adjust through a reduction in wage 
levels, and will therefore have to retrench some workers. 14 
 
As South Africa is a small country, world prices are assumed exogenous. However, South African 
exporters face a less than infinite foreign demand for exports. In order to increase their market 
share on the world market, exporters need to reduce their Free On Board (FOB) prices for 
exports. Factor supplies are fixed in the first period and then grow at the population rate for 
labour  force  and  using  an  accumulation  equation  for  capital  (Jung  and  Thorbecke,  2001). 
Transfers between institutions and government consumption in volume are fixed at the base 
year and then grow at the population rate. The rest of the world’s savings are modelled as a 
fixed proportion of GDP. 
An innovation of our study is that we split the economy into four different groups of activities. 
Each group is defined by its degree of dependency/exposure to the global crisis and is assumed 
to be affected differently by the crisis. The four groups are defined as follows (see Table in the 
Appendix). 
Unaffected sectors (Group 1): It is assumed that these sectors will face neither a reduction in 
foreign demand nor a reduction in international prices. Basically, this group 1 consists of gold, 
food and beverage commodities.  
Weakly affected Sectors (Group 2): These sectors are not heavily dependent on foreign trade 
and not closely related to other sectors. Found here are agriculture, clothing and wood. 
Mildly  affected  sectors  (Group  3):  Like  the  previous  group,  these  sectors  are  not  heavily 
dependent on foreign trade but are closely linked to other sectors. Such sectors will react to a 
reduction in consumption, investment expenditures or reduction in demand for intermediate 
goods. This group includes most transports products, trade and construction. 
Strongly affected sectors (Group 4): These sectors are closely linked to international markets 
either on the export or the import side. Here we find fossil fuels, other mining, machinery and 
equipment. 
 
Two scenarios are presented and are distinguished by the magnitude of the recession (severe 
or moderate) (see Table 3 and 4). The moderate scenario is consistent with the view that 
growth is beginning to pick up, albeit moderately, from the end of 2009 onwards. A severe 
scenario is also modelled that reflects a protracted slow global growth era and implies tight 15 
 
public budgets for some time to come. It is important to investigate what impact that scenario 
might have on the sustainability of interventions to protect children and poor families.  
Table 3 : Moderate scenario 
  Changes in world prices of exports and 
imports 
Changes in world demand for exports 
Weakly affected  -2% in 2008 and 2009   
Mildly Affected  -3.5% in 2008-2009 and +2.1% in 2010  -2% in 2008-2009, and +2.1% in 2010  
Strongly affected  -5% in 2008-2009 and +2.1% in 2010   -2% in 2008-2009, and +2.1% in 2010  
 
Table 4: Severe Scenario: 
Sectors  Changes in world prices for exports and 
imports 
Changes in world demand for exports 
Weakly affected  -10% in 2008 and 2009   
Mildly Affected  -15% in 2008 and 2009  -10% in 2008-2009, and +1% in 2010 
Strongly affected  -20% in 2008 and 2009  -10% in 2008-2009 
 
In  terms of foreign financing  of  domestic firms,  we  assume that  foreign  transfers  to  firms 
decrease by 5% in 2008-2009 and then increase by 2.1% 2010 in the moderate scenario. In the 
severe scenario, we assume that they decrease by 10% in 2008-2009 and then increases by 1% 
from 2009 to 2010. This reduction corresponds to a tightening of the liquidity available to firms 
to  finance  their  investment program  and  has  an  indirect  impact  on investment  (through  a 
decrease in savings from firms) and on the current account, as it reduces the financial resources 
available to finance imports and will require an increase in exports to compensate. After 2010, 
world prices recover to their BAU values and world demand increases at the population growth 
rate.  
The  economy-wide  model  just  described  was  used  together  with  a  micro  model  of  the 
economy, to estimate the likely effect of the economic crisis on child poverty in South Africa. 
Essentially, the major purpose of the micro model was to estimate the effect of the economic 
changes simulated by the CGE model on households through three channels: 
1.  Variations in prices, which were assumed to apply to all households. Differences only 
arose in their spending habits. Note that adult equivalence scales were also applied to 
allow for differential spending patterns. 
2.  Variations in wages in different skill categories. 
3.  Changes in employment for the three formal labour market categories.  16 
 
The methodological approach draws from the work of Cockburn et al. (forthcoming UNICEF and 
PEP working paper), Bibi et al. (forthcoming UNICEF and PEP working paper and 2009). The 
micro analysis distinguishes 14 food and 1 non-food group. Aggregate household consumption 
was converted to per capita equivalents using a “caloric requirements” approach based on 
WHO calorie requirements tables by age and sex (FAO/WHO/UNU 1985). The Almost Ideal 
Demand Systems (AIDS) approach of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) was used for converting 
individual consumption into real consumption and comparing it over time. The share of each 
good category in terms of total household consumption and the district median unit price for all 
food categories were required for estimating the parameters of the demand system. The AIDS 
model was estimated following Deaton (1997) and relies on the spatial variability of prices 
within a country in order to estimate the parameters. A three-stage least squares model was 
used  for  this  purpose.  The  poverty  rate  before  the  crisis  was  calculated  by  dividing  real 
consumption by the poverty line for the reference area, resulting in a new poverty line for all 
individuals  (Bibi  et  al,  2009:  74).  To  calculate  poverty  rates  after  the  crisis,  individual 
consumption  in  real terms  was  re-estimated  after  replacing  the  price  vector  with the new 
vector of prices (obtained from the macro model) and the change in total household income. 
Price and wage variations are relatively small and have little effect on poverty in the model. 
Changes  in  employment  had  easily  the  greatest  effect  on  poverty.  Probit  models  of  the 
probability of employment for each employed and unemployed worker for jobs in various skills 
categories were estimated. These models were then used to identify those employed workers 
in each skill category most likely to lose their jobs when employment declines relative to the 
labour  force.  The  wages  of  employed  workers  were  assumed  to  remain  as  they  had  been 
recorded. The dataset used for the micro simulations was the 2008 National Income Dynamics 
Survey (NIDS). The 2008 data was assumed to reflect the situation before the 2007 crisis. The 
model was then applied to these data to arrive at simulations. Because the micro simulations 
dealt essentially with a static model, no projections beyond 2011 were attempted. Poverty 
would almost have returned to its usual level, in terms of both scenarios, by then.  17 
 
4.  Results 
Given the magnitude of the different shocks, each scenario will generate differential outcomes 
on output, the entire price structure and, consequently, factor reallocation. However, the final 
impact on households will depend on their factor endowments and their sources of income, 
including transfers, as well as their consumption patterns. The results of the CGE analysis are 
discussed first and then followed by the results of the micro modelling. 
 
Results from the CGE model 
The CGE model assumes that in order to gain foreign market share, South African exporters 
must reduce their FOB prices, taking into account prices of competitors and the world elasticity 
of demand for South African goods. Table 5 summarises the impact of the two scenarios on 
South African FOB prices. As can be seen, there is a huge decrease in exports prices following 
the drop in international prices and demand. The decrease is of course much greater for the 
severe scenario. For the strongly affected sectors the drop of these prices is a little less than the 
drop in world export prices (-5% in 2008 and 2009 for world prices and -4% and -2.7% for the 
FOB prices in the moderate scenario). This implies that South African firms are losing ground 
with respect to their competitors and do not adjust fully to the new conditions, the downward 
rigidity of the wage rate limiting the adjustment capacity of the firms. The same is true for the 
severe scenario. It will be shown later that in terms of volume of exports, the drop of South 
African exports is greater than the reduction in the world demand. Note also that for non-
affected sectors, the decrease in FOB prices is essentially due to the decrease in the cost of 
trade and transportation margins. In the two scenarios, world prices of exports increase by 
2.1% in 2010 and resume their BAU level for the following years (up to 2015). This positive 
trajectory of world export prices nearly eliminates the effect of the preceding drop, but even in 





Table 5: Impact on export prices (% change from BAU) 
    Moderate  Severe 
Commodities  Initial 
export 
shares 
2008  2009  2010  2015  2008  2009  2010  2015 
Non-affected  11.0  -0.9  -0.9  -0.4  -0.3  -3.2  -3.7  -1.4  -1.6 
Weakly affected  9.0  -1.9  -1.7  -0.2  -0.1  -8.5  -8.7  -0.7  -0.5 
Mildly affected  31.8  -3.3  -2.1  -0.5  -0.3  -14.0  -13.9  -2.2  -2.1 
Strongly affected  48.2  -4.0  -2.7  -0.3  -0.3  -16.6  -16.3  -1.6  -1.8 
All  100.0  -3.3  -2.2  -0.4  -0.3  -13.6  -13.5  -1.7  -1.7 
 
The drop of world prices of imports will reduce the domestic cost of imported goods even if the 
reduction  is,  in  percentage  points,  a  little  less  than  the  reduction  in  world  price.  For  the 
moderate scenario, in 2008, we observe that import prices drop more than local prices for 
strongly and mildly affected sectors. As expected, these sectors experience a relative increase 
in imports compared to domestic purchases. The opposite pattern is observed for the weakly 
affected or non-affected sectors. It is important to note for the latter that there is a decrease in 
import prices due to margins. 
As  expected,  results  reported  in  Table  6  show  that  exports  decrease strongly  for  products 
belonging to the strongly affected sectors, and deeper in the severe scenario. In 2008, at the 
beginning  of  the  crisis,  exports  decrease  by  21.5%  for  strongly  affected  sectors  under  the 
severe  scenario.  The  drop  in  world  demand  has  a  direct  effect  on  exports  and  the  lower 
reduction in FOB prices with respect to world prices also reduces the performance of exports.  
It is important here to understand the behaviour of the non-affected sectors. Globally speaking, 
they benefit from the difference between local prices (that are sharply decreasing) and export 
prices  (that  are  hardly  affected)).  The  real  exchange  rate  depreciates  strongly  and  this 
movement  favours  only  those  exporting  sectors  that  are  not  affected  by  the  reduction  in 
foreign demand and international prices. For instance, the gold sector, a non-affected sector, 19 
 
sees its volume of exports increasing by 3.1% in 2008 in the moderate scenario and by 10.6% in 
the severe scenario. 
Table 6: Impact on exports (% change from BAU) 
    Moderate  Severe 
Commodities  Initial 
exports 
shares 
2008  2009  2010  2015  2008  2009  2010  2015 
Non-affected  11.0  3.3  3.2  1.3  0.9  12.4  13.8  4.7  5.4 
Weakly  9.0  -0.0  -0.6  0.8  0.3  -3.8  -3.2  3.3  2.2 
Mildly  31.8  -2.6  -1.1  -0.5  -0.9  -13.3  -14.6  -4.6  -5.0 
Strongly  48.2  -5.2  -3.9  -0.9  -1.1  -21.5  -23.0  -7.0  -6.8 
All  100.0  -3.0  -1.9  -0.4  -0.7  -13.6  -14.5  -4.0  -4.1 
 
A sharp decrease is also noted on the import side. As will be shown later, total income of 
households  will  drop  substantially,  leading  to  a  huge  reduction  in  total  absorption  and  a 
reduction of demand for imported goods. In the moderate scenario this demand reduction is 
sufficient to compensate for the positive expansion effect of lower import prices. Altogether, 
imports fall by 2.1% in the strongly and mildly affected sectors. However this decrease will be 
greater for non-affected and weakly affected sectors as the local price falls more than the 
import price. One should also keep in mind the constraint set on the current account balance, 
which is assumed to remain fixed relative to GDP. This assumption implies that if the country’s 
exports decrease, then its imports would have to follow the same path. 
As explained previously, the contraction on the demand side translates into fewer imports. This 
will affect domestic demand even more dramatically due to the increased competitiveness of 
foreign products created by the reduction in import prices. The decrease in the total demand 
for  goods  will  have  consequences  for  sectoral  production.  One  would  actually  expect 
production to decrease most strongly for sectors strongly dependent on exports. On the other 
hand, sectors that are not directly affected by the crisis might be affected by a reduction of 20 
 
demand from other sectors, for instance in terms of intermediate consumption. Finally, all the 
groups  are  affected  by  the  crisis  and  see  their  production  decrease.  The  decrease  in  the 
production of most of the sectors will have a number of consequences.  
Firms that see their exports and production fall will retrench workers as they are unable to 
adjust the nominal wage of labour. As unions are strong, producers will not be able to decrease 
wage  rates  to  adjust  to  the  fall  in  prices  and  demand,  so  they  will  have  to  dismiss  more 
workers. Only non-affected sectors, and notably the gold sector, benefit from the crisis. We saw 
earlier that gold production was increasing, and this is leads to job creation in this sector. The 
process of retrenchments will not be uniform across the different labour categories (Table 7). 
Highly skilled workers are the ones who suffer the least from the crisis. Although there are 
important job losses during 2008 and 2009 (and 2010 for the severe scenario), the economy 
rapidly  faces  a  shortage  of  skilled  workers.  This  situation  represents  particularly  well  what 
happened during this period in South Africa. 
Table 7: Impact on total labour demand (% change from BAU) 
  High Skilled  Skilled and Semi-Skilled  Low skilled 
YEARS  MOD  SEV  MOD  SEV  MOD  SEV 
2008  -4.40  -20.73  -4.90  -19.57  -5.86  -23.87 
2009  -2.36  -20.82  -3.96  -20.50  -4.23  -24.65 
2010  0  -5.49  -1.33  -7.86  -1.04  -8.24 
2015  0  0  -1.21  -6.59  -0.99  -5.28 
 
In the BAU, for each labour category, we observe that unemployment is decreasing through 
time due to the fact that capital grows faster than labour. Results reported in Table 8 show that 
for highly skilled workers only, in the base year, the unemployment rate is very low (1%) and 
actually decreases in the BAU to reach 0% in 2007. In 2009, in the severe scenario, for skilled 
workers, their unemployment rate reaches a little more than 20%.  21 
 
Table 8: Unemployment rate (%) 
  High Skilled  Skilled and Semi-Skilled  Low skilled 
YEARS  MOD  SEV  MOD  SEV  MOD  SEV 
2005  1.00  1.00  15.00  15  26.4  26.4 
2008  4.40  20.73  17.18  29.96  28.16  41.90 
2009  2.36  20.82  15.50  30.05  26.07  41.83 
2010  0.0  5.49  12.23  18.04  22.73  28.36 
2015  0.0  0.0  7.02  12.08  18.42  21.96 
 
Recall that there are actually four types of labour in the model, the three described above and 
informal labour. Assuming no unemployment of informal labour, the impact of the crisis for this 
type of labour will be on their wage rate, which falls sharply (-5% in 2008 in the moderate, and -
22% for the severe scenario). In the same way, it is not surprising to see a decrease in the rate 
of return of capital in most sectors, as most of them are affected by the crisis either through a 
drop in selling prices or demand. Taking these results into account, we can now analyse what 
happens to the different agents following the crisis. 
The sharply decreasing rate of return to capital leads to strong negative effects on firm income 
as  this  component  represents  88%  of  their  total  income.  Moreover,  one  of  the  channels 
through which the crisis operates is modelled as a decrease in transfers from abroad. Thus, we 
expect firms’ income to decrease even more. Firm income decreases by 16% in 2008 in the 
severe scenario, and even in the long run it cannot return to its BAU level. 
Firm savings are obtained after removing from their income the amount of direct taxes paid to 
the government as well as transfers to other institutions (mainly households and the rest of the 
world). We expect a dramatic fall in firm saving which is more pronounced in the short run. This 
decrease in firm savings will have important consequences for total investment. Indeed, firm 
savings represent 80.5% of total investment. Here again, we can see that, even in the moderate 22 
 
scenario, the effect of the crisis remains in the long run as firm savings remains below its BAU 
level (-1.5%). 
Households receive income from labour and transfers from firms, government and the rest of 
the world. We assume that transfers from government and the rest of the world are fixed, 
whereas transfers from firms are a proportion of firm income. As household income is mainly 
based on labour income, we expect it to decrease. Moreover, as mentioned previously, firm 
income  is  decreasing  and  so  are  the  dividends  it  pays.  Thus,  household  income  decreases 
sharply in both scenarios. This decrease negatively affects household consumption and savings 
and thus total absorption through a reduction in consumption and investment.  
Government revenue is expected to decrease. Indeed, direct taxes are decreasing (as a share of 
households and firm income), and taxes on products are also decreasing for most sectors (due 
to the decreases in imports and production). Half of government income comes from direct 
taxes and around a third from indirect taxes on products. The drop in these two components 
will contribute to a total decrease in government revenue and a substantial increase in its 
deficit. 
In both scenarios made about the severity of the crisis, GDP falls in 2008 and 2009 and then 
increases again. However, it does not return to its BAU value even by 2015. In other words, 
without positive shocks or deliberate and successful interventions to stimulate the economy 
and counteract the negative effect of the world crisis, GDP will not recover to what it would 
have been without the crisis. Given all the preceding effects, it is no surprise to observe a huge 
decrease in total investment. What is relevant here is that, even though the crisis affected only 
2008 and 2009 and the recovery started in 2010, the effects on investment remain in the long 23 
 
term. Both scenarios predict lower investment in 2015 than the BAU does
9. 
Results from the micro-model 
Child poverty in 2007 (before the crisis) was estimated at 52.6% when using the moderately low 
poverty line of R250 per capita per month in 2000 rand terms, or R377 in January 2008 (when 
applying the NIDS data)
10. Without an economic crisis, this headcount  rate of child poverty 
would be declining by a small percentage every year if one linked the macro and the micro 
simulations. It would have declined to 52.2% in 2008 and to 51.9% in 2009. It would have 
declined to 51.8% by 2011 according to the business as  usual simulations. Thus, business as 
usual would have meant a slow but continuing decline in child poverty. 
 
Table 9: Trends in poverty under three scenarios, 2007-2011 
















2007  Individual level  P0  0.468  0.0%         
    P1  0.183  0.0%         
    P2  0.095  0.0%         
  Child level  P0  0.526  0.0%         
    P1  0.205  0.0%         
    P2  0.107  0.0%         
2008  Individual level  P0  0.463  -1.1%  0.471  0.6%  0.508  8.5% 
    P1  0.182  -0.5%  0.208  13.7%  0.287  56.8% 
    P2  0.095  0.0%  0.125  31.6%  0.212  123.2% 
  Child level  P0  0.522  -0.8%  0.527  0.2%  0.549  4.4% 
    P1  0.205  0.0%  0.230  12.2%  0.294  43.4% 
                                                       
9 On the other hand we could argue that, in the long run, the reduction in investment will lead to a reduction in the capital 
stock because of the continuous depreciation of capital stock. A reduction in the speed that capital is accumulated could 
eventually lead to a change in the rate of return of capital. This could cause firms and households to increase their savings. The 
same argument could apply to the behaviour of foreign firms. They could eventually rebuild their capital stock, thereby helping 
their domestic partners to increase their investments. If this happens, then the permanent effects mentioned here of the crisis 
could eventually become only temporary if the households and firms try to rebuild their stock of capital at their usual levels. 
10 This is a poverty line often quoted in the literature. The ‘lower bound’ poverty line of Statistics South Africa of R322, quoted 
by Woolard and Leibbrandt (2006) and derived by Hoogeveen and Ozler (2005), is about 30% higher. The ‘upper bound’ line of 
R593 per capita per month in 2000 is about 140% higher. 24 
 
    P2  0.106  -0.9%  0.137  28.0%  0.208  94.4% 
2009  Individual level  P0  0.462  -1.3%  0.465  -0.6%  0.510  9.0% 
    P1  0.182  -0.5%  0.197  7.7%  0.287  56.8% 
    P2  0.095  0.0%  0.113  18.9%  0.212  123.2% 
  Child level  P0  0.519  -1.3%  0.522  -0.8%  0.545  3.6% 
    P1  0.204  -0.5%  0.219  6.8%  0.304  48.3% 
    P2  0.106  -0.9%  0.125  16.8%  0.215  100.9% 
2010  Individual level  P0  0.462  -1.3%  0.460  -1.7%  0.479  2.4% 
    P1  0.181  -1.1%  0.181  -1.1%  0.216  18.0% 
    P2  0.094  -1.1%  0.094  -1.1%  0.133  40.0% 
  Child level  P0  0.519  -1.3%  0.518  -1.5%  0.536  1.9% 
    P1  0.203  -1.0%  0.203  -1.0%  0.238  16.1% 
    P2  0.105  -1.9%  0.105  -1.9%  0.145  35.5% 
2011  Individual level  P0  0.459  -1.9%  0.460  -1.7%  0.472  0.9% 
    P1  0.179  -2.2%  0.180  -1.6%  0.206  12.6% 
    P2  0.093  -2.1%  0.094  -1.1%  0.122  28.4% 
  Child level  P0  0.518  -1.5%  0.518  -1.5%  0.529  0.6% 
    P1  0.201  -2.0%  0.202  -1.5%  0.228  11.2% 
    P2  0.104  -2.8%  0.104  -2.8%  0.135  26.2% 
Note: % change is shown relative to BAU in 2007 
Source: Own projections 
 
Figure 4 shows that the most severe effects of the crisis occurred in 2008 and 2009, while by 
2010 the effects on poverty were already being reversed to some extent, even under a severe 
scenario. Its scale allows for a visual inspection of the different effects, but the range is small. 
However, it accentuates the stark difference between the severe and moderate scenarios. If 
one focuses on the headcount ratio only, and uses this slightly below conventional poverty line, 
it is clear that the effect of the moderate scenario on the child poverty headcount was quite 
small in 200811. The child poverty headcount ratio (P0) hardly increases (by only 0.1 percentage 
points, or 0.2%). However, there is a 12% increase in the child poverty gap ratio (P1) and a 28% 
increase in the child poverty severity ratio (P2). 
                                                       
11 In practice, poverty lines for this model are derived for each cluster of households in the sample using price levels in their 
area as reflected by consumption patterns. The per capita lines are those derived directly from the data without considering 
prices by determining what poverty line would give the same child poverty headcount ratio.   25 
 
Figure 2: The poverty headcount ratio (P0) for 2007 to 2011 under three scenarios: Business 
as Usual, Moderate Scenario and Severe Scenario  
 
 
This indicates that many of the changes in the economic situation in 2008, in terms of the 
moderate scenario, occur at lower levels of income (that is, some way below the poverty line). 
Thus, the poorest are also the most affected. The moderate scenario shows that child poverty 
actually starts improving in 2009. The headcount ratio drops to 52.2%, only 0.3% above the 
level of poverty that would have applied in the business as usual scenario and below the initial 
poverty headcount ratio. Nevertheless, some effect on the poverty gap ratio and on the poverty 
severity ratio for children remains. This indicates that, although fewer children were poor in 
2007, the changes at the bottom of the distribution have worsened the situation for the worst 
off children. If the poverty line had been drawn at a lower level, the poverty headcount also 















In the case of the more severe economic growth scenario, the child poverty headcount ratio 
would rise by 4.4% (2.3 percentage points) to 54.9% in 2008 compared to 2007, the poverty gap 
ratio  by  43%  and  the  poverty  severity  ratio  by  94%.  This  again  illustrates  the  severe 
consequences  for  children  at  the  bottom  of  the  income  distribution,  that  is,  far  below 
conventionally used poverty lines. Clearly, in the severe economic scenario, very poor children 
were greatly affected by the crisis in 2008.  There was little further change in the poverty 
figures in 2009 if one used the three conventional measures.  
Figure 3 shows the effect of the moderate scenario in 2008 and 2009 against the initial situation 
in terms of cumulative density functions. If one CDF line lies clearly above poverty, using any of 
the conventional measures and irrespective of the poverty line chosen, we have stochastic 
poverty dominance. The three lines showing the initial situation and the moderate scenarios in 
2008 and 2009 are barely distinguishable, except at the very lowest income levels, where there 
is clear poverty dominance. These scenarios show relatively small changes that would probably 
fall within 95% confidence levels of the initial cumulative density function. In comparison, the 
child poverty situation would have been much worse if there had been no child support grant: 
the line depicting that situation lies well above all the other three lines. Thus, the moderate 
scenario for the economic crisis shows an effect that is far too small to undo the beneficial 





Figure 3: Cumulative density functions (curves) for child poverty in 2007, 2008 and 2009, in 




Figure 4 shows the CDFs that compare the 2007 situation with the effect of the severe scenario 
in 2008 and 2009. Here the effect of the crisis is much clearer and there appears to be complete 
poverty dominance. Irrespective of the poverty measure or poverty line chosen, except for very 
high poverty lines, there is a large (and probably statistically significant) effect on poverty. It is 
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Figure 4: Cumulative density functions (curves) for child poverty in 2007, 2008 and 2009, in 
the severe scenario, and a comparison with the beneficial effects of the child support grant 
 
 
In summary, the cumulative density functions indicate that the effect of the moderate scenario 
is not that large. In contrast, the effect of the severe scenario is great, particularly at the lower 
levels. Clearly, we are dealing with poverty effects that affect the poorest most.  
Using a lower poverty line confirms what the CDFs and the magnitude of the effects on P1 and 
P2, relative to P0, have already intimated. This is that the major effect of the crisis is closer to 
the bottom of the income distribution. At the lower line, the effect of the severe scenario is to 
increase the poverty headcount ratio more than was the case at the higher line.  
Another way of looking at this is to separate the effects on child poverty in urban and rural 
areas. Poverty amongst children is more severe in rural than in urban areas. In 2007, before the 
crisis, poverty amongst children in urban areas was 44.9% as against 58.7% in rural areas. The 
economic crisis appears to have a similar effect in terms of who crosses the poverty line in 
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affects already poor children in rural areas much more. P2 rises by 55% in urban areas in 2009 
and by 136% in rural areas, using the severe scenario. All poverty measures improve a little in 
urban areas, while P2 deteriorates by 31% in rural areas if one applies the moderate scenario. 
Even  the  price  effects,  which  tend  to  moderate  the  difference  at  lower  incomes,  cannot 
overcome the greater effect of labour market events in rural areas. This clearly needs a longer 
run to determine the positive effect of a return to economic growth.  
The greater effect of the crisis at lower income levels and in rural areas may, at first glance, 
appear strange. However, further investigation shows that, although much of the income loss 
occurs  in  urban  areas  and  even  among  skilled  workers,  these  people  are  better  protected 
against job losses because they are often members of households that have a variety of other 
income sources. Apart from social grants, which have a similar effect of diversifying income 
among the poor, the poor and rural dwellers are, in many cases, quite weakly protected against 
job loss. It is therefore not surprising that they fall below, or further below, the poverty line 
when they lose their jobs.   
If one separates that part of the effect caused by price changes and job losses, we see that the 
effect of job losses is by far the greater. Nevertheless, price changes do play an independent 
role and in some situations serve to moderate the effect of poverty on rural compared to urban 
areas. This particularly applies to people close to the poverty line.
12  
5.  Conclusion 
Child poverty is high and has already long been a source of concern in South Africa, thus the 
progress made in the past decade to reduce it through expanding the child grant system was 
very important. This paper has shown that a decrease in world prices, together with the drop in 
world  demand,  led to a  fall  in production for  most  sectors.  This  reduces  employment  and 
unemployment rates increase as a result. Households see their income drop. The situation is 
worse for informal workers who do not have the protection of an effective wage floor that 
unions provide. They face a huge drop in their wage rate (earnings). Firms also suffer from the 
                                                       
12 This may not seem an appropriate way of modelling the results, and one may wish to revert to a scenario in which only the 
effect  of  the  labour  market  is  measured.  Nevertheless,  in  this  model,  poverty  lines  have  been  set  for  each  cluster  of 
observations in the initial sample based on the price ratios that appear to apply in those clusters. The methodology is described 
in the technical report. 30 
 
crisis as their incomes and savings decrease tremendously. Even if the crisis only lasts for 2008 
and 2009, its effects will remain long afterward, particularly because of the permanent effect of 
the drop in investment. The combination of macro- and micro-modelling in this paper shows 
that the impact of the economic crisis did not completely reverse the positive impact of the 
grants. Yet it is evident that the economic crisis did indeed have an impact on monetary poverty 
in  South  Africa.  The  moderate  scenario  shows  a  limited  impact,  but  it  is  felt  most  by  the 
poorest.  In  the  case  of  the  severe  scenario,  the  impact  is  much  greater  and  it  affects  the 
poorest again by far the most. The Child Support Grant provides some protection against the 
effects of the economic crisis.  
How  likely  are  the  two  scenarios  discussed?  One  should  consider  that  the  CGE  model 
specifically attempted to isolate the effects of the global financial crisis, separate from the 
earlier  but  perhaps  enduring  effects  of  the  international  fuel  and  food  crises.  Thus  actual 
outcomes  may  be  worse  than  modelled.  It  appears,  from  present  knowledge,  as  if  the 
moderate scenario may better reflect the course of the international economy than the severe 
scenario. Further, it appears as if the economic impact of the crisis has been less than under the 
severe scenario, yet the employment effects appear considerably worse than the moderate 
scenario. This may be the result of even greater wage rigidities (increasing wages during an 
economic crisis) than allowed for in the macro-model. 
The time period over which this paper has looked at the crisis did not really allow for a policy 
response in terms of anti-poverty policy. In fact, such responses are always slow to implement 
and depend largely on existing institutions. The Child Support Grant in South Africa is a major 
instrument to this end, as it is already in place and protects the vulnerable both before the 
crisis  and  during  it.  Moreover,  in  principle  it  is  possible  to  use  it  to  expand  transfers  to 
households, though the constellation of fiscal forces in South Africa (the fact that grants are 
already being expanded very rapidly) and the relatively short duration of this crisis reduced its 
potential role during this crisis. 
It needs to be emphasised that this paper did not consider household and individual responses 
to poverty, which may have unknown impacts on actual poverty outcomes, particularly for 
children,  who  cannot  protect  themselves  from  the  impact.  Intra-household  behaviour,  for 31 
 
instance the extent to which households allocate their resources to protect children from the 
worst effects of the crisis, is of particular importance. But household formation, dissolution and 
fracturing can all occur in response to changing economic situations. To some extent, the Child 
Support Grant mitigates the possible impact of such behaviour on children, as it makes it more 
attractive to have them as part of the household. 32 
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Appendix: Sectors grouped according to severity of the impact of the crisis 
 
Group  Sectors  Number of 
sectors 
Group  1:    (Non  
affected sectors)  
Gold & uranium ore mining 
Food 
Beverages & tobacco 
3 
Group  2:  Sectors 
weakly affected 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 
Textiles 
Wearing apparel 
Leather & leather products 
Footwear 
Wood & wood products 




Group  3:  Sectors 
mildly affected: 
Building construction 
Electricity, gas & steam 
Basic non-ferrous metals 
Metal products excluding machinery 
Other industries 
Basic chemicals 
 Printing, publishing & recorded media 
Other chemicals & man-made fibres 
Rubber products 
Plastic products 
Glass & glass products 
Non-metallic minerals 
Wholesale & retail trade  
Catering & accommodation services  
Railway transport 
Road transport 
Transport via pipeline 
Water transport  
Air transport  
Transport support services  
Communication  
Finance & insurance 
Business services  
Medical, dental & other health & veterinary services 
Community, social & personal services  
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